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Abstract Ageing is the major challenge for the PAYG pension systems in devel-
oped countries. Most of them are undergoing reforms in order to adapt to the new
demographic reality. The package of reforms implemented includes increasing the
retirement age, reducing the replacement rate, or introducing a sustainability factor
linking pension to life expectancy. The aim of this paper is to analyse the potential con-
sequences of a different type of reform that is at a very incipient stage in Spain but that
could have a significant impact if it were fully implemented. This reform, called ‘silent
reform’ because it is imperceptible to citizens in its early stages, basically consists in
increasing maximum pensions in line with inflation instead of wage or productivity
growth. This policy is reducing the replacement rate only for high earning workers
and increasing the redistributive component of the system. This paper is the first to
quantify and evaluate the potential consequences of this type of reform in Spain. We
have used an accounting model with heterogeneous agents and overlapping genera-
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tions in order to project pension expenditure for the next six decades. The results show
that this type of reform could potentially contain future expenditure but at the cost of
changing the nature of the pension system from a contributory or Bismarckian-type
system into a pure redistributive pension system or Beveridgean-type one.
Keywords Ageing · Spanish pension system · Reform · Sustainability · Accounting
projection model
JEL Classification H55 · J11 · J26
1 Introduction
There is no doubt that the population ageing is threatening the financial sustainabil-
ity of Pay-As-You-Go pension systems. In the last decades, many countries have
undertaken major reforms and others are now undergoing similar processes. Spain
finds itself in this latter case, and several studies have shown that, in the absence of
reforms, pension expenditure would increase in the next four decades, accelerating
from 2035 onwards (European Commission 2009a; MTIN 2008; Jimeno et al. 2008;
Diaz-Saavedra 2005; de la Fuente and Doménech 2009; Rojas 2005; Sanchez-Martin
and Sanchez-Marcos 2010; Alonso and Herce 2003; Herce et al. 2009). The changes
approved in Spain in 2011, which included increasing the retirement age from 65 to
67, among others, together with the introduction of the Sustainability Factor in 2013,
are the most significant reforms that have been made in decades.
Despite the last twomajor reformsof theSpanish pension system, the ageingprocess
is so intense that it will be impossible to prevent the replacement rate from decreasing
at least 20 to 25 percentage points moving from the current 74 to 50 % in the next
decades.1 As a result, a public debate has arisen, in which it is argued that it would be
fairer if the inevitable fall in the replacement rate were mainly focused on pensioners
with the highest pensions.
Therefore, if this typeof reformwere to be implemented, itwould change the basis of
the Spanish pension system from a contributory system (or Bismarckian) to a universal
pension system (or Beveridgean). Currently, both types of pension models exist in
Europe. Bismarckian systems are designed to provide a sufficient retirement income
for all workers: from the low skilled to the highly skilled. In contrast, the Beveridgean
pension system aims to ensure a minimum pension and, as a result, requires lower
contributions, leaving room for the middle classes to add to their pension pot with
private savings. Indeed, countries with a Beveridgean system have an average pension
expenditure of 6 % of GDP, while countries with a Bismarckian pension system have
an average expenditure of more than 10 % of GDP.
In view of the above, how could this type of reform be implemented? In the case
of Spain, this would be feasible if some key parameters of the pension system were
1 The changes approved in 2011 only solved about one-third of the expected increase in pensions expen-
diture without reforms, as it was highlighted in several studies [see MEH (2011), Banco de España (2010),
Fuente and Doménech (2013) and Conde-Ruiz and González (2013)].
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modified—in particular the value of the maximum and minimum pension, as well as
the upper and lower limit of the contribution base. This would result in major changes
in the redistribution and the overall generosity of the system, which is defined as
the ratio between average pension and productivity. In fact, a low intensity reform
of this type has been carried out in Spain. Some experts have named it the ‘silent
reform’ of the pension system due to the fact that it is almost imperceptible to voters
in the initial phase. More specifically, the key measures in this kind of reform are: (1)
adjusting pensions in line with inflation instead of wage growth, and (2) setting a cap
to the maximum retirement benefit an individual may receive (maximum pension) and
indexing it to inflation. In a period of economic growth, these measures would imply
an increase in the number of retired individuals whose pensions would be limited due
to themaximum pension limit. For this reason, any of these twomeasures could reduce
future pension expenditure because they would break the link between benefits and
wage growth.
The aim of this article is to quantify the potential consequences of this hypo-
thetical reform, which has been widely discussed and studied in theoretical terms in
Spain [amongst others Boldrin et al. (2000), Jimeno (2002), Alonso and Herce (2003),
Conde-Ruiz and Alonso (2004) and Conde-Ruiz and Jimeno (2004)]. To date, there
are no studies quantifying its implications, and this paper is the first to analyse its
hypothetical impact on the Spanish pension system.
The main results of the paper show that if this type of reform were to be fully
implemented, it would change the basis of the Spanish pension system by transforming
it into a universal pension system (or Beveridgean). We quantified how the intra-
generational redistribution element in the pension system would increase. Moreover,
we show the important implications that this sort of reform would have on reducing
future expenditure, as well as on the overall generosity of the system. In order to
evaluate the potential of the reform in the sustainability of the Spanish pension system
we compared its effects with those of the 2011 reform, which, among other changes,
increased the retirement age from 65 to 67.
The idea of converting the Bismarckian Spanish pension system into a Beveridge
one is starting to enter public debate. The financial crisis in Spain has exacer-
bated income inequality, not only due to significant wage devaluation, but also to
a high increase in the long-term unemployment rate. In this respect, Conde-Ruiz
and Profeta (2007) have provided a positive theory on why a Bismarckian or a Bev-
eridgean system may arise. They show that income inequality represents the key
determinant in social security design and suggest that Beveridgean systems may
be supported by a voting coalition between low-income individuals, who favour
its redistributive aspect, and high-income individuals, who support the reduced size
of the Beveridgean system, which allows them to make more use of private provi-
sions.
This paper is set up as follows: Sect. 2 discusses the role of the upper limits to
contribution bases and pension benefits and the institutional aspects of the Spanish
pension system. The methodology used in our simulations is presented in Sect. 3.1.
Next, the results related to individual pensions are collected in Sect. 3.2, regarding the
percentage of new pensions that are affected by both the upper cap and the amount
to which the pension is limited. The implications regarding the sustainability of the
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pension system are discussed in Sect. 3.3. In Sect. 3.4, the consequences for the nature
of the system are examined. Finally, we draw our conclusions. Additional results are
presented in the Appendix, together with the rules for calculating retirement pensions
in Spain.
2 Bismarck vs Beveridge
If we examine PAYG pension systems worldwide, we can see that different
degrees of intragenerational redistribution exist and that there are no completely
pure Bismarckian systems. There are a number of papers, such as Disney (2004)
or Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), that have classified different pension sys-
tems in the world as either Bismarckian or Beveridgean.2 Bismarckian systems
are designed to provide a sufficient retirement income for all workers: from the
low skilled to the highly skilled. In contrast, the Beveridgean pension system
aims to ensure a minimum pension and, as a result, requires lower contributions,
leaving room for the middle classes to add to their pension pot with private sav-
ings.
As shown by Disney (2004) and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), each system has
specific and different characteristics3 which were present at the very beginning of both
systems. On the one hand, the Beveridgean system has historically been associated
with lower pension expenditure in terms of GDP compared to Bismarckian systems.
On the other hand, countries with a Beveridgean system tend to have more developed
private pension systems and the use of private pension plans is more widespread. The
aforementioned differences can be seen in the following Fig. 1, in which several coun-
tries are classified by type of pension system according to Disney (2004): Bismarckian
(BI with a diamond) or Beveridge (BE with star), together with the public and private
expenditure of each country. It can be observed how Beveridgean countries spend
about 6 % of their GDP on public pensions, while Bismarckian countries spend on
average more than 10 % of their GDP. In contrast, the reverse occurs when analysing
expenditure on private pensions. Countries with a Beveridgean system spend much
more on private pensions than their Bismarckian counterparts: 3.5 % compared with
just less than 1 %.
In the case of the Spanish pension system, it is a contributory or Bismarckian
system and it has a certain degree of intragenerational redistribution through its mini-
mum pensions. The Social Security system establishes maximum andminimum limits
to the contributions and pensions, which are set each year by the government. And
the relation between the lower and upper limits of both pensions and contribution
bases is one of the key factors in determining the future development of the sys-
tem.
2 To classify a pension system as either Bismarckian or Beveridge, Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) and
Disney (2004) defined a Bismarckian index using the correlation between wages and pension received.
3 A more recent classification of countries according to the Bismarkian or Berverdigean nature of the
pension system Krieger and Traub (2013) gives almost the same result as Disney (2004).
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Fig. 1 Public and private pension expenditure in Bismarckian and Beveridgean countries (% of GDP).
Source: OECD (2013) and Disney (2004)
2.1 The mechanism of the ‘silent reform’ of the pension system
The pension system in Spain4 seemed not to have undergone any major reform in the
two decades before the reform that was approved in 2011,5 in which the retirement age
was increased to 67 among other changes, and the introduction of the Sustainability
Factor designed in year 2013.6
However, even during the period without reforms, and according to some experts,
the Spanish social security systemwas undergoing changes caused by the development
of some of the system’s key parameters, including the maximum and minimum limits
on pensions and contributions. The pension policy over the last 15 years, as discussed in
more detail in Sect. 2.2, shows two clear trends: (1) the value ofminimum pensions has
increased in real terms, while maximum pensions have been adjusted with inflation—
4 The Spanish social security system is a PAYG system, and is defined as one in which a retired worker
receives a pension that is dependent on their employment history (wages, years of contribution to the
system and retirement age). In 2013, the Sustainability Factor was designed and approved (Law 23/2013
of 23 December, Reguladora del Factor de Sostenibilidad y del Índice de Revalorización del Sistema de
Pensiones de la Seguridad Social) and will come into force in 2019. It will take into account the increase
in life expectancy at age 67 in the calculation of the initial retirement pension.
5 Prior to the 2011 reform, the two most relevant reforms took place in 1997 and 2002. In 1997 eligibility
and the reference wage were extended to 15 years and the replacement rate was changed. With the 2002
reform early retirement was allowed at 61 for workers who had not contributed before 1967 but who had
a minimum of 30 years of contributions. It also introduced changes to the penalization coefficient linked
with age of retirement. See more details in Appendix A.
6 See Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2014) and Sanchez-Martin (2014) for an analysis of the impact
of this reform.
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maintaining their value in real terms but reducing their purchasing power in relation
to the average wage; and (2) minimum contribution bases have been reduced in real
terms, while the upper limit of contributions has remained almost constant in real
terms.
The slight modification of these parameters has not received much attention in the
media or in political arenas because they have been regarded as secondary factors
to the financial sustainability of the pension system. However, as we will see in the
paper, persistent changes to these parameters will generate significant modifications
in the distributive structure of the social security system and would inevitably have an
important impact on both the policy on pensions and their financial sustainability. This
iswhy it has been called a ‘silent reform’ [amongst others, Boldrin et al. (2000), Jimeno
(2002), Alonso and Herce (2003), Conde-Ruiz and Alonso (2004) and Conde-Ruiz
and Jimeno (2004)]. It substantially affects the nature of the social security system
without reforming any of the criteria that are considered to be the most important ones,
such as the contribution rate, retirement age, contribution bases, pension formulae,
etc.
Despite the fact that the general population would not notice the impact of this
type of reform at its incipient stage, the consequences would be evident in time. Let
us look at a scenario in which there is a positive growth rate in productivity and all
the pensions (including the maximum pension) are adjusted in line with inflation.
If wages (and all contribution bases including the maximum limit) grow steadily at
the rate of productivity, but the maximum pension threshold is not adjusted in line
with wages, then the replacement rate (ratio pension / average wage) will decrease
for individuals entitled to the maximum pension—and the ratio (average pension
/average productivity) of the system as a whole will also decrease. Therefore, in time,
pension value would stop increasing at the same rate as wages and would eventually
reach the cap. Consequently, the number of people receiving the maximum pension
would increase over time. Moreover, there would be a decrease in the ratio between
the average pension and average productivity. Nowadays the number of individuals
who retire with a maximum pension is around 3 %. If this mechanism were taken
to its extreme, with wages growing at the same rate as productivity (and therefore
contributions as well), the number of individuals eligible to receive the maximum
pension would also increase, although the value of the pension would remain constant
in real terms.
This result would imply that this sort of reform would transform the system from
a contributory or Bismarckian system (such as the current Spanish system in which
pensions depend on past contributions), into a Beveridge system or pure redistributive
pension system, in which all individuals receive the same pension regardless of their
contributions. This would mean that the very nature of the pension system would
change without anyone realising. This critical aspect will be discussed in detail in
Sect. 3.4. The increasing gap between the limits would also affect the sustainability
of the system, and, although more individuals would receive the maximum pension
the generosity of the system would decrease in time because the maximum pension
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value would remain constant in real terms. This means that not only would the nature
of the system change, but it would also have important effects on containing pension
expenditure, as we will see in the next section.
2.2 Institutional elements
The Spanish Social Security system establishes maximum and minimum limits to the
contributions and pensions, which are set each year by the government. Employers and
employees contribute a percentage of theworker’swages to the social security system.7
Contributions are limited by both a floor bmin and a ceiling bmax. The contribution base
represents the fraction of labour earnings subject to social security contributions and
it is linked to wage ω:
bt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
bmin for ωt < bmin
ωt for bmin ≤ ωt ≤ bmax
bmax for ω > bmax
(1)
At the same time, the Spanish pension system is characterised by having aminimum
(i.e. pmin) and a maximum retirement pension (i.e. pmax). The minimum pension is
intended for those individuals who are eligible to receive a contributory pension but
whose contributions are below a certain threshold. This floor depends on the type of
pension (retirement, widowhood, disability or orphanage), age (older or younger than
65) and personal circumstances (with or without dependent spouse), and, moreover,
there is also an earnings limit. However it does not depend on the number of years of
contributions. The maximum pension limits the amount that individuals with higher
pensions would receive.8 The contributory pension that an individual receives can be
expressed as:
P =
⎧
⎨
⎩
pmin for p < pmin
p for pmin ≤ p ≤ pmax
pmax for p ≥ pmax
(2)
These two elements have evolved differently over time. The minimum pension
value has historically increased in real terms (with significant increases in the years
before the start of the crisis). In contrast, the maximum pension value has remained
fairly constant in real terms over the past two decades, due to its rising in line
with inflation. Figure 2 shows the trend of the upper limits for both pensions and
contributions since 1982,9 and the following points are relevant for the simula-
tions carried out in this article: (1) the maximum contribution base has historically
increased with inflation at the same time that the different professional categories
7 The statutory contribution rate for common contingencies is 28.3 %, of which 4.7 % is paid by the worker
and 23.6 % by the company.
8 It was established in the year 1984 and it is the same for all pension types and personal circumstances.
9 For the evolution of the lower limits for contribution bases and pensions, see Conde-Ruiz and González
(2016).
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Fig. 2 Maximum contributions and retirement pensions (euros/year real terms 2006, 1983–2015). a Con-
tribution base. b Retirement pension. Source: Ministry of Employment and Social Security and INE
were grouped together, remaining steady in real terms from the year 2002 onwards.
It has increased since 2013; (2) the upper limit for the maximum retirement pension
was established in 1984 and it remained constant (in nominal terms) between 1984
and 1988. At the same time the prices increased considerably, so the maximum pen-
sion dropped a 23.4 % in real terms. Later, it increased in line with inflation up until
2010 but has not followed the trend of real wages. It has dropped in real terms since
2011.
In a contributory system, the relation between contributions and pensions (max-
imum and minimum values) is a key element of the intragenerational redistri-
bution of the pension system and both ratios should be stable and equal to 1.
For individuals with complete working histories who always had the maximum
(or minimum) contribution base the corresponding pension should be equal to
the maximum (or minimum) limit. Figure 3 shows the evolution, since 1984,
of the ratio between the minimum pension and contribution base values (pen-
sion/contribution base) and the same ratio between the maximum values. The
maximum pension has remained steadily below the maximum contribution cap
(ratio less than 1) in the last ten years. Since 2000, the minimum pension has
grown above the minimum contribution limit (ratio greater than 1). In 2015,10
the maximum pension was 17.1 % lower than the maximum contribution base,
while the minimum pension was 20.7 % higher than the minimum contribution
base. This first piece of evidence points towards the system already bearing the
effects of a greater difference between the maximum pension and the maximum
contribution base. This means that those workers who contribute continuously
the maximum amount would receive a lower pension from the system than they
should according to their contributions, and vice versa for those who contribute the
minimum.
10 In 2013, the maximum contribution base rose 5% and the maximum pension 1%. In 2014 the maximum
contribution increased by the same amount as in 2013, and all pensions including the maximum limit grew
by 0.25 %.
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Fig. 3 Ratio pension to contribution base—minimum and maximum (1984–2015). Source: Ministry of
Employment and Social Security and own elaboration
3 From Bismarck to Beveridge: the case of Spain
The aim of this paper is to analyse the potential effects of a pension reform through
changes to the maximum limits (contribution bases and pension values) in the coming
decades up until 2070. We will quantitatively study the potential consequences to the
Spanish pension system of different growth rates between the maximum contribution
base and the maximum pension benefit. In particular, we will look at the potential
effects of such a reform regarding sustainability, as well as its ability to alter the
nature of the pension system, i.e. to transform a contributory or Bismarckian pension
system (the current Spanish pension system) to a Beveridgean system. The model
used is an accounting model with heterogeneous agents and overlapping generations
in order to project revenues and expenditures of the pension system for the next six
decades.
As seen in the previous section, maximum and minimum limits are fixed each year
by the government. Although it is not possible to capture exactly how the effects
of these decisions will evolve in time, we are going to set out different possible
scenarios. First of all, we will assume that both the upper and lower caps for con-
tributions and pensions will grow at the same rate as productivity. This scenario will
be called ‘scenario 1 or neutral’, i.e. where the mechanism explained in Sect. 2.1
does not apply. We will also examine three alternative scenarios in which the growth
rate of the maximum pension benefit is lower than the productivity rate. Specifi-
cally:
– two ‘middle scenarios’: the maximum contribution base grows alongside produc-
tivity, as in the neutral scenario, but the maximum pension increases 50 and 30 %
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of the productivity growth, respectively. They are called scenario 2 or (1, 0.5) and
scenario 3 or (1, 0.3), respectively.
– a ‘scenario 4 or extreme scenario’ [or (1, 0)]: the maximum contribution grows at
the same pace as productivity, as in the neutral scenario, but the maximum pension
benefit is not indexed with productivity and remains constant in real terms.
The methodology used for the projections is described in the next section and in
Sect. 3.2 we present the results obtained concerning the impact of the reforms on: (1)
the number of new pensions that are capped and (2) the quantity by which the new
pensions are limited. In order to analyse the impact on individual pensions we will
focus on pensions obtained by employees (or under the General Regime) who retire at
the legal age of 65, because it is the most affected group by this sort of reform.11 We
will also discuss their possible effects on the sustainability of the pension system (Sect.
3.3) prior to the 2011 reform (in this case we also consider the workers who retire
early). This will allow us to analyse the potential of this type of reform by comparing
the results from 2011 obtained in Conde-Ruiz and González (2013) with the same
model, the same methodology and the same demographic scenario.12 Finally, we will
highlight the implications of the system through the analysis of its generosity and the
replacement rate (Sect. 3.4).
3.1 Projection methodology
The developed model is an accounting projection model with heterogeneous agents
and overlapping generations, used for the projection of revenues and expenditures of
the Spanish social security system. It includes a high degree of individual distinction
(by age, gender, nationality and level of education).13 The simulation period starts in
2006 and runs over six decades up to 2071.
Individuals live for 17 periods where every period corresponds to five calendar
years. They enter the economy at the age of 15 and live, at most, until the age of 100.
The maximum potential working life of an individual is therefore ten periods (from
age 15 to 64), as 65 is the legal retirement age. Themaximum period of potential life in
retirement (for individuals retiring at 65) is seven periods. Individuals are classified by
age and also bygender (male and female), educational level (primary school, secondary
school and tertiary education), and by country of origin (natives and immigrants). So,
there are a total of 12 different groups of individuals and each one is divided into 17
subgroups according to age.
11 Appendix B provides details of these results in case of early retirement between 61 and 64 and for
self-employed individuals.
12 It is important to point out that it is not appropriate to compare our results with the impact of the 2013
reform as generated by other authors (MINECO 2014; Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra 2014; Sanchez-
Martin 2014) because they use a methodology and demographic scenario different to ours.
13 Model developed in González (2013) and used in Gonzalez et al. (2009) to analyse the impact of the
migration phenomena in the Spanish pension system and in Conde-Ruiz and González (2013) to evaluate
the pension reform approved in 2011.
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The model includes a great deal of detail regarding the Spanish pension system,14
which allows us to differentiate between employees contributing to the general system
(Régimen General de la Seguridad Social) and self-employed workers contributing to
the special self-employment scheme (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos),
which are analysed separately. The total number of qualifying years or years of con-
tributions, the contribution bases and the retirement age are elements that determine
the calculation of an individual’s pension and are all taken into account.
The simulation strategy is developed in three main phases. Firstly, the population
projection based on the Cohort Component Population Projection Method with the
aforementioned heterogeneous agents is employed. Secondly, the reconstruction and
projection of employment history is carried out using data from the Continuous Sam-
ple of Working Histories of Social Security (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales,
MCVL),15 micro data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and the corresponding
data from the National Statistical Institute of Spain (Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica de España, INE) to obtain the transition probabilities for five different working
situations (employed, self-employed, unemployed, disabled and another situation of
inactivity) according to the different heterogeneous agents considered. During their
working lives, individuals contribute to the system. Once they retire they receive a
retirement pension that depends on the terms of their employment history. We also
take into account that they may generate a widow’s pension when they die. The cal-
culation of the pension expenditure is the third stage of the projection process.
STAGE 1: Demographic projection The first phase of the model consists on the
projection of the population up to 2071. To calculate this projection we employ the
14 The projection model contains individual heterogeneity and institutional detail that is a noteworthy
characteristic of this model in comparison with other models used to project pension expenditure in Spain.
Firstly, it can distinguish age, sex, educational level and nationality [versus other models, such as in Jimeno
(2003), Diaz-Saavedra (2005), Sanchez-Martin and Sanchez-Marcos (2010), Jimeno et al. (2008), Diaz-
Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2006), Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2009), Sanchez-Martin (2001) and
Sanchez-Martin (2010)]. Secondly, as far as we are aware, our model is the first to consider five different
working situations for any given individual (employed, self-employed, unemployed, disabled and inactive)
versus papers by Jimeno (2003), Alonso andHerce (2003), Sanchez-Martin (2001), Sanchez-Martin (2010),
Diaz-Saavedra (2005), Diaz-Gimenez andDiaz-Saavedra (2006), Diaz-Gimenez andDiaz-Saavedra (2009),
Rojas (2005) and Sanchez-Martin and Sanchez-Marcos (2010). Moreover, this is one of few models that
employs data gathered from the administrative database called Continuous Sample of Working Histories
(Gil et al. 2008; Moral-Arce et al. 2008; Herce et al. 2009 also employ this database) to predict accurately
contributions in accordance with individual heterogeneity. It includes detail at the institutional level that
allows us to obtain precise data on pension value and incorporates widow’s pensions. The model also takes
into account other important elements in the system such as the upper and lower cap of both contributions
and pension benefits; key elements that are being examined in this paper. Other articles that have taken this
into account to some extent include Jimeno (2003), Sanchez-Martin and Sanchez-Marcos (2010), Diaz-
Saavedra (2005), Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2006), Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2009) and
Moral-Arce et al. (2008).
15 The Continuous Sample of Working Histories is a database created by the Spanish Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs that contains records of the working and pension histories of 4 % of the people who,
at any time in the corresponding wave, had a registered record with the social security system, either as
contributors or as pensioners. For more details, see Seguridad Social (2006) and Argimón and González
(2006).
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Cohort Component Population Projection Method. The demographic situation in the
year 2006 is taken as the starting point in order to be consistent with data from the
database Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) for the same year. We adopt
the overall demographic hypotheses regarding life expectancy (and corresponding
survival probability) and fertility rates released by the Spanish National Institute of
Statistics (INE) in its long-term projection scenario up to 2051 [see, INE (2005)]. For
the period 2051–2071 we assume a stable development of the three variables from
2051 onwards. The total figures projected by the INE for total number of births and
net migration flows are categorised by gender, age and nationality. Moreover, we have
taken into account the level of education of future generations as it constitutes an
important factor regarding employability. We assume that all the new generations will
reach the same level of education as the most educated individuals so far, (i.e. those
born in 1975 and who were 32 years old in 2007). The implications of this assumption
mean that the percentage of the labour forcewith only an elementary level of education
will decrease and that the percentage of university graduates will increase by ten points
by 2060 [see, González (2013)].
STAGE 2: Projection of work history We project both revenue and expenditure
of the social security system taking into account the assumptions about labour force
participation, employment and productivity until the year 2051 in line with the macro-
economic scenario used by Spain’s Ministry of Economy and Finance joint exercise
with the European Commission for long term pension expenditure projection (Euro-
pean Commission 2009a)]. From the year 2051 onwards it is assumed that forecasts
will remain constant until 2071. Our underlying assumption is that the relevant legis-
lation will not change; therefore the contributions will grow parallel to wages, which
in turn will grow at the same rate as labour productivity.
Labor productivity growth rate is the main element of the macroeconomic scenario.
In the long run, the growth in labor productivity (output per hour worked) broadly
coincides with TFP growth divided by the labor share (set at 0.65). In particular, the
EPC assumptions establish that TFP growth rates (for each country) will converge to a
long-term historical average TFP growth rate recorded in the EU, of 1.1 %. However,
as a sensitivity exercise, we are going to consider a new scenario for the productivity
growth rate where the growth rate is 50 % lower in the short run and 12 % lower in
the long run.16 As we will see along the paper, the effects of the ‘silent reform’ would
be minor when we consider this alternative scenario with a lower productivity growth
rate.
The labormarket scenario basically implies an evolution towards a full employment
situation [unemployment rate of 6.2 % and employment rate (15–64) close to 73 %].
Women and older workers are responsible of the main increases in the employment
rate (Table 1).
16 This scenario for the labor productivity growth rate is consistent with the latest assumptions in European
Commission (2015).
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Table 1 Macroeconomic scenario 2021–2051
2021 2031 2041 2051
Labor productivity (growth rate) 2.7 1.9 1.7 1.7
Participation rate (15–64) 75.7 76.5 77.2 77.6
Employment rate (15–64) 71.0 71.8 72.4 72.8
Unemployment rate (15–64) 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
Source: European Commission (2009b)
Individuals between 15 and 64 years of age can be in five possible situations dur-
ing their working life: working as an employee, be self-employed,17 unemployed,
receiving disability benefits or be in another situation of inactivity,18 such as being in
education. Between the ages of 66 and 99, it is assumed that individuals are retired,
with or without the right to receive a pension, according to the rules determined by law.
We have defined 120 different groups of individuals (12 groups divided by gender,
education and nationality, and 10 by age between 15 and 64) whose contributions to
the system and their pensions upon retirement we simulate. To reconstruct complete
working histories we use real work histories from when they started working gathered
from MCVL data.
Using the micro data obtained from the Labour Force Survey we calculated transi-
tion probabilities for the five possible situations between ages 15 and 64 in each time
period of the life cycle according to age, gender, skill and nationality. Then, we esti-
mated the probability of each of the five work situations conditional on the situation in
the previous period using a Monte Carlo simulation. The estimation process follows
a finite Markov chain that is, for the set of individual characteristics, homogeneous
across workers and the corresponding conditional transition probability matrix.19
The transition probabilities obtained are consistent with the situation observed
for the base year and the expected trend of the average employment rate over the
projection period. Therefore, the virtual future history is obtained by incorporating
macroeconomic assumptions and the probability of being in one of the five labour
situations, differentiating by age, gender, nationality and educational level, in order to
calibrate the corresponding rates of activity, employment and unemployment for each
of the different groups of individuals.
Finally, retirement patterns of individuals classified by gender, educational level
and age are observed through MCVL data. Individuals can retire early (between the
ages of 61 and 64) or at the ordinary age of 65, differentiating them by gender and
17 This distinction enables us to apply the characteristics of each scheme regarding retirement, for example
in the special scheme for self-employed (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos, RETA) early
retirement is not allowed. In Spain, there are several contribution schemes organised by different sectors,
but we assume the full integration of regimes into two main groups in the future: one for those employed
within the General Regime (Régimen General, RG) and other for self-employed individuals contributing
under the Special Scheme for Self-Employed (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos, RETA), as
recommended by the Toledo Pact Commission but not yet implemented.
18 Including the situation of inactivity is relevant because there are differences by gender, educational level
and nationality as shown in González (2013).
19 See, González (2013) for further details.
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level of education. It is important to point out that we do not model the endogenous
behavioral reactions of individuals to developments in the economic and legal envi-
ronment; however, we gain in the microeconomic precision and data reliability of our
simulations carrying out the computational exercise at the highest disaggregated level.
STAGE 3: Revenues and expenditures projection The model projects the work
histories of the individuals (according to age, gender, skill and nationality) and their
contributions to the system. It follows the assumed growth rate of wages (which corre-
sponds to the growth rate of productivity from a macroeconomic scenario). The total
revenue is equal to the sum of employed, self-employed and unemployed contribu-
tions20 [for further details see González (2013)]. Once the work histories of each of
the 12 different groups (by age, gender, skill and nationality) are obtained, we have
the key elements to calculate the corresponding retirement pensions: (1) number of
years of contributions, (2) wages (i.e. the contribution base) and (3) retirement age.
The average pension benefit for each group is then calculated using these records and
by applying the legislation.21 Pension expenditure takes into account pensions at 65
and early retirement between 61 and 64. The total expenditure of the system is the
sum of expenditure on retirement, widow’s and disability pensions.22
3.2 Impact on individual pensions
The first noticeable effects of different increases in the maximum pension and the
contribution limits would be an increase in the number of individuals whose pensions
would have been capped. That is, in the future it is expected that new pensions will be
higher, not only because wages will also be higher due to their growth in line with pro-
ductivity, but also because individuals will have better work histories due to improve-
ment of their education level. This is especially true for women, whose increased
participation in the labour market, together with higher qualifications, will lead to
higher pensions in the future. However, if the maximum pension value grew at a lower
rate than productivity and themaximumcontribution base grew alongside productivity,
it would mean that a greater number of pensions would be capped as time passes.
In this section, wewill analyse the consequences of thewidening of the gap between
the maximum pension value and the maximum contribution base for different groups
of individuals, bearing in mind that the level of heterogeneity of the model is very
high since individuals are classified according to their age, sex, educational level
and nationality. The analysis in this section will focus on employed people (General
Regime) who retire at 65 because it is the most affected group by this sort of reform.
Moreover, our model also allows for the observation of what happens with early
retirement (age 61–64) and the self-employed. Details about these groups are included
in Appendix B.
20 Given the configuration of the Spanish system, a person receiving unemployment benefit generates rights
for retirement through the contribution.
21 See Appendix A for more details about the rules on retirement in Spain.
22 See González (2013) for more detail about survivor’s and disability pensions.
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Fig. 4 Percentage of new capped pensions. Scenario comparison (2021–2071)
The impact on the percentage of new pensions that are limited by the upper cap
varies from scenario to scenario, as shown in Fig. 4. The effects start to be evident
in 2036 in scenario 2 [or scenario (1, 0.5)], in 2031 in scenario 3 [or scenario (1,
0.3)], and in 2021 in scenario 4 or extreme scenario. In Fig. 4, we show the projected
trend of percentage of pensioners affected in the coming decades. By 2051, 51 % of
new pensions would be capped in scenario 2, while in the most extreme scenario this
proportion rises to 75 %. In this case, scenario 4, the effects would begin in 2021 and
the percentage of capped pensions would rise over time exceeding 70 % by 2051 and
reaching 100 % in 2071.
As we said before, if we have considered a scenario with a lower productivity
growth rate, the effects of the ‘silent reform’ would be minor. In the case of the new
capped pensions, the percentage in the extreme case would be 12.8 points lower in
2050, that is a 62.2 % of total retirement pensions (see Fig. 9a in the Appendix C).
In a more detailed analysis, included in Table 2, men would be affected more
than women by the mechanism described in Sect. 2.1 in every scenario. If we take the
educational level into account, university graduates would have the highest percentage
of limited pensions. This is to be expected, as graduates have a more complete work
history and earn higher wages. There are also differences between the categories
for men and women. However, women’s pensions would be generally less affected,
although those with higher qualifications would see their pensions capped. From 2041,
the percentage of womenwith a university degree and capped pension benefit is higher
than for their male equivalents. This is due to improved educational and work histories
than their older counterparts.
Once we have obtained the percentages of new pensions affected, it is interesting to
evaluate their impact on what the average pension is worth. Since a higher percentage
of capped pensions are to be expected than in the neutral scenario, it is therefore also
expected that this sort of reform would reduce the value of the average pension of the
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Table 2 Percentage of new capped pensions by scenario, gender and skill
Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0)
2021 2051 2071 2021 2051 2071 2021 2051 2071
Male
Primary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.7 0.0 25.8 34.7
Secondary 0.0 16.6 15.9 0.0 16.6 15.9 0.0 16.6 25.9
Tertiary 0.0 40.4 39.4 0.0 40.4 39.4 22.8 40.4 39.4
Total 0.0 57.0 55.3 0.0 57.0 80.0 22.8 82.8 100.0
Female
Primary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 0.0 0.0 23.5
Secondary 0.0 0.0 13.1 0.0 13.1 13.1 0.0 13.1 22.2
Tertiary 0.0 45.7 54.3 0.0 54.2 54.3 0.0 54.2 54.3
Total 0.0 45.7 67.4 0.0 67.3 79.8 0.0 67.3 100.0
Table 3 Variation of the average newpension value in each scenario against the neutral one (%, 2021–2071)
Year Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0)
2021 0.0 0.0 0.0
2031 0.0 −1.3 −6.3
2041 −1.9 −8.5 −19.3
2051 −6.7 −15.6 −30.9
2061 −11.1 −23.3 −40.6
2071 −15.5 −29.4 −49.0
system. For example, within four decades, the value of new pensions could be between
6.7 and 30.9 % lower than the benefit recognized in the neutral scenario (see Table 3).
Following the individual details of the model, the value of pensions would decrease
more for men than for women in any of the proposed scenarios (Table 7 in Appendix
B). This is because men have higher contribution bases than women for any given
level of education. Furthermore, if we take skill into account in the case of the extreme
scenario, the resulting pensions could register a 44 % reduction in their quantity by
2051. In the case of university graduates, there is nearly a 60 % loss by 2071 (see
Table 8 in Appendix B).
If we consider the scenario with a lower labor productivity growth rate, in 2050 the
decrease in the average new pension value would be halved (in the case of the scenario
4) with a reduction of a 16.3 % instead of a 30.9 % (see Fig. 9b in Appendix C).
In Table 4, we compare the potential results of a pension reform as the analysed
in this article with the reform of the Spanish pension system approved in 201123 in
order to assess its potential. It is clear that the effects on the average pension are very
similar to those obtained under scenario 2 or (1, 0.5).
23 See Appendix A for further details of changes under this reform.
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Table 4 Variation of the average new pension value by scenario. Comparison with 2011 reform (year 2051)
Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0) Reform 2011
(Conde-Ruiz and
González 2013)
Total −6.7 −15.6 −30.9 −9.1
Gender
Male −8.8 −17.8 −33.4 −8.1
Female −4.3 −13.2 −28.0 −10.1
Skill
Primary 0.0 0.0 −11.7 −11.5
Secondary −3.5 −10.1 −24.3 −11.1
Tertiary −10.3 −23.4 −40.4 −7.4
3.3 Impact on sustainability
In this section, we will analyse the potential implications that changes in the pension
system such as those described in this paper would have on the evolution of total
pension expenditure based on the different scenarios presented. As described in Sect.
3.1, we obtained the work histories and key elements necessary to calculate retirement
pensions (number of years of contributions, contribution bases and retirement age).
Then, we calculated the corresponding average pension for each group and applied the
corresponding legislation. Total pension expenditure includes retirement pensions at
65 and early retirement between 61 and 64, taking into account both retirees under the
employees or General Regime (Régimen General, RG) and under the special scheme
for self-employed (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos, RETA). As we
have indicated, we will obtain the results based on the Spanish pension system prior
to the 2011 reform for comparison.
As expected, the total pension expenditure will increase in the coming decades, not
only due to higher life expectancy but also due to the fact that pensions will be higher
because of the improvement of work histories. However, if the maximum contribution
cap grows at the same rate as productivity and the upper pension limit remains constant
in real terms (our extreme scenario), the value of the new pensions will be limited,
as shown in the previous section, which would have implications in terms of the total
pension expenditure. The difference between the neutral and the extreme scenarios
would be perceptible from 2031 onwards because there would be a significant number
of retirees at 65 entitled to themaximumpension. In fact, population dynamics plays an
important role since, as seen in Fig. 5, themaximumnumber of newpensions is reached
in 2040, when larger numbers of people (those from the baby boom) would retire and
the trend of pension expenditure a percentage of GDP would adopt an inverted ‘U’
shape. At the same time, under the extreme scenario, pension expenditure for new
pensions would continue to increase until 2046. From that point onwards there would
be a two-fold effect: the number of new retirement pensions at 65 would be lower
due to population dynamics, and the type of reform analysed would have its greatest
impact in 2046.
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Fig. 5 New retirement pensions at 65 and expenditure: extreme and neutral scenarios (2021–2071)
If the characteristics mentioned were to remain constant over time, pension expen-
diture would be lower. Total expenditure would be lower if the scenario were closer
to the extreme scenario, and it could reach, in comparison with neutral scenario, 3.2
percentage points (p.p.) of GDP by the year 2051 (see Table 5). The reason for this is
obvious: in our model all wages grow in line with productivity and this means that all
contribution bases (including the maximum) also grow at this rate. This implies that
the Reference Wage (Base Reguladora) also grows for all individuals, which in turn
generates the growth of benefit amount. Due to the fact that pensions have a maximum
limit, a greater number of workers are entitled to the maximum pension. The higher
the percentage of workers with a maximum pension, the lower the expenditure of the
system. Moreover, if the maximum pension increase is 30 [scenario 3 or (1, 0.3)] or
50 [scenario 2 or (1, 0.5)] % of productivity growth, then expenditure would be lower
from 2041 onwards and, by 2051, it would be down 1.4 p.p. of GDP in scenario 3 and
0.4 p.p. of GDP in scenario 2.
Therefore, if the Spanish Pension System were to shift towards a Beveridgean one
along the lines of themechanismdescribed in Sect. 2, therewould be a significant effect
on containing pension expenditure.As seen in this paper, it could lead to a 3.2 p.p. of the
GDP reduction of expenditure by 2051 (Table 5) in an extreme scenario, comparedwith
the 3.7 p.p. of GDP reduction under the 2011 reform, based on the same methodology
and the same demographic scenario as in Conde-Ruiz and González (2013).24
24 We have focused the analyses on the mechanism of the ‘silent reform’ when the maximum pension
benefit grows at a lower rate than the maximum contribution base and the minimum pension benefit grows
at the same rate as productivity. If we assume an alternative scenario where the minimum pension remains
constant in real terms, then the effects over future expenditure would be more pronounced, as can be seen
in Conde-Ruiz and González (2016).
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Table 5 Total pension expenditure and reduction by scenario (2021–2071)
Expenditure (% GDP) Reduction (p.p. GDP)
Year Scenario 1 (neutral) Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0)
2021 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
2031 13.4 0.0 0.0 −0.2
2041 20.1 −0.1 −0.5 −1.3
2051 24.3 −0.4 −1.4 −3.2
2061 22.9 −0.8 −2.2 −4.7
2071 21.4 −1.5 −3.3 −6.1
Again, the labor productivity growth rate plays a crucial role on the impact of the
‘silent reform’. In the scenario with a lower productivity growth rate, the impact over
total pension expenditure over GDP (in the case of the scenario 4 or extreme scenario)
is reduced a 40 %. Specifically, it could lead (in scenario 4) to a 1.4 p.p. of the GDP
reduction of expenditure by 2051 (see Fig. 9c in the Appendix C).
If we analyse the revenue of the social security system as a percentage of GDP,
it is easy to understand that, if all the contribution bases (including the maximum
contribution base) grow at the same rate as worker productivity (i.e. scenario 1), total
contributions will remain constant over time. However, it is also possible that an addi-
tional impact of the reform described previously could arise if we consider different
scenarios where the maximum contribution base25 would grow at a higher rate than
productivity. In this sense, we have considered two alternative scenarios: one where
the maximum contribution base grows at 1.5 times the productivity growth rate and a
second scenario where it grows at twice the productivity growth rate. As can be seen in
Fig. 6, the impact on social security revenues could be significant, while in the second
case it could imply an increase of around 3 percentage points of GDP by the year 2061.
3.4 Implications for the nature of the system: from Bismarck to Beveridge
If the process set out in this paper were to adopted, i.e. that the maximum contribution
capgrows at the samepace as productivity and the upper benefit cap remains constant in
real terms, it would have a significant effect on pension expenditure. However, it would
also take place at a cost, since it would have important distributional consequences.
Regarding the generosity of the system (defined as the ratio between average pension
and productivity),26 the maximumwould be reached in 2051 in all scenarios, but in the
more extreme scenario there would be a lower level of generosity across the system.
Within four decades, generosity would be the 24.2 % in scenario 2, 23.2 % in scenario
25 According to data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories of Social Security, the percentage
ofworkers in Spainwith themaximum contribution basewould be around a 10–15%. Cuadrado et al. (2011)
and Bonhomme and Hospido (2012) observed that the 10th percentile of female earnings distribution is
capped, rising to nearly 20 % for male earnings.
26 The ratio of total pension expenditure toGDPcan be decomposed as a function of threemain components:
demographics, the labour market and the institutional factor. The following equation illustrates the role
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Fig. 6 Revenues under different maximum contribution growth rates (2021–2071)
3 and 21.2 % in scenario 4 or extreme, versus 24.6 % in a neutral scenario (Table 9 in
Appendix B). Generosity would decline over time in all scenarios from 2051 onwards,
when the number of pensioners affected increases, and would be most pronounced in
the extreme scenario (see Fig. 7). This sort of pension reform could become a powerful
mechanism to avoid the transfer of growth in productivity to pensions. Note that if no
such changes were made, growth in productivity would transfer to the contribution
bases (or wages), then to the Reference Wages, and finally to pensions.
The impact over the generosity would be a reduction of 3.2 points if we consider the
scenariowith a lower labor productivity growth rate. In this case the ratio of the average
pension to productivity would be 24.4 % in 2051 (see Fig. 9d in the Appendix C).
The ratio between pension value and contribution base can provide an insight into
what would happen to the nature of the system under the type of reform analysed in this
article. It is known as replacement ratio because it highlights the relation between an
individual’s pension and their last wage. If the pension system is purely contributory
or Bismarckian, this ratio remains roughly constant in line with contributions. This
implies that if someone has a higher salary (i.e. a higher contribution base), he will
contribute more overall and will be entitled to receive a higher pension. As observed
in Fig. 8, the ratio is maintained nearly constant in the neutral scenario. In the case of
Footnote 26 continued
generosity plays in the institutional factor and so on in the total expenditure as percentage of GDP.
Pension Expenditure
GDP
= Pop. >65 years old
Working Age Pop.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Demographic Factor
· 1
Employment Rate
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor Market Factor
·
Elegibility
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Number of pensions
Pop. >65 years old
·
Generosity
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Average Pension
Average Productivity
︸ ︷︷ ︸
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Fig. 7 Ratio of average pension to productivity (2021–2071)
female university graduates the replacement rate increases slightly due to the fact that
they have more complete work histories, therefore gaining access to higher pensions.
In a Beveridgean (or pure redistributive pension system) pensions do not depend
on contributions to the system. As stated previously, in a system of this type, the
replacement rate decreases with respect to wages because all individuals receive the
same pension regardless of their salary. Therefore, workers with higher wages have
a lower replacement rate. This is precisely the result of maintaining the maximum
pension value constant in real terms, while the maximum contribution base increases
at the same pace as productivity. Figures 8a, b show these contrasts as reflected in our
extreme scenario for Spanish individuals retiring at 65, in which the replacement rate
would decrease alongside the level of education.
The results obtained in this article prove that it would be possible to change the
nature of the system from a contributive or Bismarckian type to a Beveridgean one.
The kind of reform analysed in this paper would increase the intragenerational redis-
tribution element in the pension system. This means that apparently small changes
in some factors could lead to a significant structural reform that would completely
change the nature of the system.27
Evidently, the reduction in the replacement rate alongside the level of education is
less pronounced if we consider our scenario with lower productivity growth rate. This
27 This sort of reform also has implications in terms of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Following the
methodology described in Jimeno and Licandro (1999) and Devesa Carpio et al. (2002) we have calculated
the IRR for employed people (General Regime) who retire at 65. If the extreme scenario or scenario 4 took
place, individuals in this group would have 3.4 % IRR as opposed to 4.4 % in the base scenario for the year
2051. It is noteworthy that this reduction would affect men and women differently. Men would have 2.9
% IRR in the extreme scenario and 4.0 % in the neutral scenario; meanwhile, women would have 3.9 %
IRR instead of 4.7 %. Educational background is also a factor and those at higher levels would be the most
affected.
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Fig. 8 Ratio first pension to last contribution base. Neutral and extreme scenario by gender and educational
level. Year 2051 and 2071
fact proves that the lower the labor productivity growth rate is, the slower the change
in the nature of the pension system towards a Beveridgean type.
4 Conclusions and discussion
The Spanish social security system, as well as many other European ones, has to
face the challenge that an ageing population presents. There is no doubt that the
average replacement rate (RR) will decline due to ageing pressure. However, there are
several ways this reduction could be achieved: either by decreasing the RR linearly
and guaranteeing the contributory element of the system, or by reducing the RR only
for high earning workers and increasing the redistributive component of the system.
We have shown that a full implementation of the pension policy that has already been
adopted by the Spanish current and previous governments would result in the second
option. This policy consists on increasing maximum pensions in line with inflation
instead of wage or productivity growth. This paper explores the potential effects and
implications of this theoretical idea and shows that it has relevant effects over the
generosity of the pension system (by decreasing the ratio between the average pension
and the average productivity) and its financial sustainability. We have shown that
these changes could have significant effects on the expenditure of the system. In the
most extreme case, it could imply a lower expenditure of 3.2 percentage points of
GDP by 2051 and 6.1 p.p. of GDP by 2071. This impact is of great importance when
compared to the effects of the 2011 pension reform. Conde-Ruiz and González (2013)
demonstrated, using the same methodology and the same demographic scenario as
in this article, that the 2011 reform (in which the calculation period was extended,
retirement age was increased to 67 and a modified replacement rate was applied to the
reference wage) may imply a 3.7 p.p. of GDP reduction of expenditure by 2051.
As we have seen, different growth rates between the maximum pension benefit
and the maximum contribution base constitute per se a potential powerful reform
mechanism that also has distributional effects. The policy of indexing the maximum
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pension with inflation may seem harmless and may seem not to imply any institutional
change to the pension system, at least in the early stages. However, it is not the case
in a context of growing wages (in real terms), as we have shown in this paper. In
particular, the application of this type of reform could imply, in an extreme scenario,
an average retirement benefit reduction of 50 % in the long term for workers with a
tertiary education level. This means that it would reduce the average generosity of the
pension system and would contribute its the financial sustainability.
However, given that this decrease in the average generosity of the system would
be achieved by reducing only higher pensions, the reform also increases the degree
of intragenerational redistribution of the system. Therefore, we have also shown that
the reform could completely change the nature of the system, transforming it from a
contributory or Bismarckian system into a pure redistributive or Beveridgean one.
This result is crucial as it opens the door to a possible reformof the pension system in
Spain. The intensity of the ageingprocesswill inevitablymake the average replacement
rate drop significantly. At the same time, widening income inequality has increased
political support for lowering the replacement rate only for the highest pensions.
Regarding this, it is important to point out that the Bismarckian system was originally
created as a response to the demands of the middle class to provide a sufficient level of
income in old age.Universal pensions in a pure redistributive system (i.e. Beveridgean)
were created with the aim of providing a minimum pension equal for all workers, but
leaving enough room for individuals to add to their pension packages with private sav-
ings. Bothmodels already exist in Europe, and the only danger of this kind of change is
not the change itself, but rather introducing it in a timelymanner to give citizens enough
time to adapt their decision-making regarding savings to the new pension system.
We have also seen that the labor productivity growth rate plays a crucial role on
the impact of the ‘silent reform’. In particular, the higher the growth rate is, the lower
the effects over the sustainability, the level of the pensions and over the changes in the
nature of the pension system.
The main limitation of our methodology is that we assume decisions made by
the workers (retirement age or educational level) are exogenous. In other words, our
simulations are subject to the ‘Lucas critique’ in the sense that we do not model
endogenous behavioural reactions of workers to changes in the rules of the social
security system and their effects over the relative prices. In this respect, our simulation
does not take into account important implications. This simplification has allowed us
to incorporate a very precise institutional detail of the Spanish pension system within
the model, as well as a high level of individual heterogeneity amongst individuals.
Wehave seen that the ‘silent reform’ generates a strong reduction in the generosity of
the pension system with a significant reduction of the replacement rates, and therefore
individual decisions over retirement, savings and human capital investment must be
affected. Individual retirement behavior is largely influenced by wealth or income
effects. Several studies [see e.g. Costa (1998), Butler et al. (2005) and Euwals et al.
(2010)] show that both expected andunexpected decrease inworkers’ incomeorwealth
induce them to postpone retirement. At the same time, a reduction in the pension
income combined with the increase in longevity, may induce individuals to save more,
not only in physical capital, in order to accumulate assets for the retirement period [see
e.g. Higgins (1998), Kelley and Schmidt (1996), Masson et al. (1998) and Bloom et al.
123
484 SERIEs (2016) 7:461–490
(2003)], but also in human capital by training-on-the-job and by learning-by-doing,
in order to remain active in the labor market for a longer period of time. In a nutshell,
the reaction of the individuals to the reduction in pension generosity (i.e. delaying
retirement, increase in private savings and more investment in human capital) will not
only help them to adapt to the new demographic scenario, but will also reduce the
problems of financial sustainability of the pension system.
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Appendix A: Retirement in Spain
The key factors for calculating retirement pensions in Spain, up to the application of
the Sustainability Factor in year 2019, are: (1) eligibility, (2) number of qualifying
years, (3) wages through contribution bases and (4) retirement age.
Eligibility depends on the number of years that contributions were made and on
the age of retirement. Pensions are granted to individuals who have contributed to the
system for at least 15 years, two of which must be within the last 15 years prior to
retirement, who have reached the age of 65 (prior to the 2011 reform) and have retired
from the active labour force. Early retirement can be taken from 61 to 64 by those
individuals with a minimum period of contribution of 30 years and incurs a percent-
age reduction of the pension benefit.28 For eligible individuals, the Spanish system
provides an old age pension benefit equal to: pt = αθw˜, where w˜ is the reference
wage (Base Reguladora), θ is the replacement rate (percentage applied to the reference
wage or BaseReguladora) andα is the penalty for early retirement. The referencewage
represents the weighted average of contributions to social security over the 15 years
prior to retirement (following the system before the 2011 pension reform), and where
contributions made in the two years prior to retirement are indexed to inflation (Eq. 3).
w˜t =
(∑24
i=1 bt−i +
∑180
i=25 bt−i
C P It−25
CP It−i
)
210
(3)
where bt is the contribution base at time t and CP It represents the consumer price
index at time t . The denominator is equal to 210 because it takes into account that the
28 Prior to the 2011 reform, the two most relevant reforms took place in 1997 and 2002. In 1997, the
number of years required to be entitled to a retirement pension was increased from 8 to 15 years with the
corresponding timetable. Moreover, the period for calculating the reference wage was extended from 8 to
15 years and the replacement rate was established as 50 % for the first 15 years of contributions. Each
additional year up to year 25 adds 3 % and from that year onwards, each additional year adds another 2 %
until reaching 100% for 35 years of contributions. Pensions have been indexed to inflation since this reform.
Later, the 2002 reform allowed for early retirement at 61 for those workers that had not contributed before
1967 and had contributed a minimum of 30 years. Moreover, it also introduced changes to the penalization
coefficient for early retirement and a premium for late retirement was introduced (2 % per additional year
beyond 35 years of contributions or qualifying years).
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Spanish social security pension pays pensions in 14 payments per year.29 This refer-
ence wage may not coincide with the actual wage, due to the existence of upper and
lower caps for contributions. Moreover, a replacement rate is applied to the reference
wage depending on the number of qualifying years. An individual who has reached
the minimum of 15 qualifying years (or years of contributions) will receive a benefit
equal to the 50 % of the reference wage; for the next 10 years (up to year 25), each
year will add a 3 % to the replacement rate; between years 26 and 35, each year will
contribute an additional 2 %. When the individual has contributed the maximum of
35 years, the replacement rate is equal to 100 %, and any further years of contribution
have no marginal value for workers.
α =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 for N < 15
0.5 + 0.03 (N − 15) for 15 ≤ N ≤ 25
0.8 + 0.02 (N − 25) for 25 < N < 35
1 for N ≥ 35
(4)
where N represents the qualifying years (or years of contributions). Finally, coefficient
α relates pension benefits to retirement age according to the following formula:
α =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 for R < 61
1 − γ (65 − R) for 61 ≤ R < 65
1 for R = 65
(5)
where R represents retirement age. The discount parameter γ is equal to 8 % for indi-
viduals with less than 30 qualifying years (or years of contributions) and between 7.5
and 6 % for the rest depending on the number of qualifying years. The corresponding
minimum (pmin) and maximum (pmax ) limits will be applied to the resulting pen-
sion. Note that while the formulas for calculating retirement pensions are the same for
employees (or General Regime, RG) and the special scheme for self-employed (Rég-
imen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos, RETA), early retirement is not possible
under RETA.
The 2011 reform did not affect eligibility but introduced some changes to three key
parameters including the replacement rate, the period of calculation and the retirement
age, as well as establishing a transitional period until the year 2027 to reach the new
values. The number of years required to reach 100 % of the reference wage was
increased from 35 to 37 years, changing the scale to a regular and proportional one
from the minimum one of 50 % at 15 years. The period of contributions is extended to
the last 25 years (instead of 15 years) and the statutory retirement age is raised from
65 to 67 by 2027 (although workers who have contributed for at least 38.5 years will
be entitled to a full pension at age 65). The reference wage after the 2011 reform is
calculated as follows:30
29 Ley 24/1997, de Consolidación y racionalización del Sistema de Seguridad Social.
30 The Sustainability Factor in Law 5/2013 will link the initial pension to changes in life expectancy at age
67. Its application will begin in 2019 and it will be automatically reviewed every 5 years. In addition, the law
established a new Pension Revaluation Index that is obtained taking into account the balance between the
revenue and expenditure of the system. All pensions, including the minimum one, will be adjusted annually
by this percentage with a floor of 0.25 % and a cap based on Consumer Price Index growth plus 0.5 %.
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w˜t =
(∑24
i=1 bt−i +
∑300
i=25 bt−i
C P It−25
CP It−i
)
350
(6)
Retirement age There is a well known pattern: workers retire either at the first legally
permitted age31 or at 65, evidence for which is collected in papers such as Jimenez-
Martin and Sanchez-Martin (2000), Boldrin et al. (2004) and Jimenez-Martin and
Sanchez-Martin (2007). The model takes into account that individuals can retire early
(between 61 and 64 years) or at the ordinary age of 65 if before the 2011 reform (or
at the correspondent age after the reform), and be classified by gender and level of
education.32
Qualifying years The complete work histories show that workers who retire within
four decades have, on average, longer work histories. A general increase in both the
number of men and women in this category is observed, regardless of nationality.33
Total pension expenditure Pension value is calculated for each group at each point
in time according to the corresponding law and taking into account the number of
qualifying years (or years of contributions) and the retirement age. We then apply the
corresponding floor (pmin) and ceiling (pmax ) to the resulting amount. The formulae
for calculating pensions are the same for employees (RG) and self-employed (RETA),
although in the latter the possibility of early retirement is not allowed.Total expenditure
for retirement pensions is the sum of pensions that take place at 65 and between 61
and 64.
Appendix B: Detailed results
See Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 in Appendix B.
Table 6 Percentage of new capped pensions by regime and age of retirement. Extreme scenario (2021–71)
General regime Self-employment regime
Year 65 years 64 years 63 years 62 years 61 years Regime
2021 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2031 40.0 28.5 20.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
2041 72.3 53.3 56.8 34.4 18.4 0.0
2051 75.0 78.0 80.1 44.0 56.1 0.0
2061 94.9 91.7 85.3 74.2 80.4 34.3
2071 100.0 100.0 96.6 70.1 74.2 68.6
31 Early retirement at 60 in Spain was only possible for those who had made contributions before 1967
(the number of these cohorts are currently reducing due to aging). In 2001, the minimum retirement age
was set at 61.
32 See González (2013) for more details on retirement patterns in Spain.
33 Native men would exceed 40 qualifying years regardless of educational level. Women with secondary
education qualifications (high school and college graduate) would experience the largest increase, reflecting
women’s increased participation in the labour market. However, only for those with a university degree
would the gap between both genders be reduced (see, González 2013).
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Table 7 Variation in new pensions value in the neutral scenario by gender (%, 2021–2071)
Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0)
Year Male Female Male Female Male Female
2021 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2031 0.0 0.0 −2.3 0.0 −9.1 −1.4
2041 −3.5 0.0 −10.4 −6.2 −21.3 −16.8
2051 −8.8 −4.3 −17.8 −13.2 −33.4 −28.0
2061 −13.6 −8.6 −25.5 −21.0 −42.9 −38.2
2071 −17.4 −13.6 −31.8 −27.0 −51.0 −47.0
Table 8 Variation in new pensions value in each scenario, by gender and level of education (%)
Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0)
2021 2051 2071 2021 2051 2071 2021 2051 2071
Male
Primary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −15.4 0.0 −17.0 −38.4
Secondary −6.0 −16.3 0.0 −16.9 −28.3 0.0 −30.3 −47.7
Tertiary −15.1 −28.0 0.0 −28.1 −43.0 −0.2 −44.0 −59.9
Female
Primary 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.5 0.0 0.0 −22.6
Secondary 0.0 −4.4 0.0 −0.2 −17.7 0.0 −15.7 −39.9
Tertiary −6.4 −19.8 0.0 −19.5 −36.5 0.0 −37.4 −55.3
Table 9 Generosity (ratio average pension/productivity) of the system in each scenario (%, 2021–2071)
Year Scenario 1 (neutral) Scenario 2 (1, 0.5) Scenario 3 (1, 0.3) Scenario 4 (1, 0)
2021 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5
2031 21.0 21.0 21.0 20.7
2041 23.6 23.5 23.0 22.0
2051 24.6 24.2 23.2 21.2
2061 24.2 23.3 21.8 19.1
2071 24.5 22.8 20.6 17.2
Appendix C: Sensitivity analysis
See Fig. 9 in Appendix C.
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